Soldiers on the School Run
Last night I was at the Royal Geographical Society for the annual IRC-UK lecture, ‘Soldiers on the School Run: Sensible Strategy or Disastrous Compromise?’ This is the latest in a series of events trying to define what it is we’re up to in the business of humanitarian interventions. It’s clear to honest professionals in both the military and the aid industry that the way we are dealing with complex emergencies is not working and needs to get a lot better – fast. There’s no choice. The rate of State failure is accelerating. We simply cannot afford too many Somalias.
On the one hand, the military is engaged in adapting to WW4 – the kind of battles waged or imagined in WW2 and the Cold War are history. WW4 is a counterinsurgency war. Neither the battles between national armies that characterized WW2, nor the long distance threatening of the Cold War are relevant to today’s forces fighting jihadists in the fields and villages of Afghanistan. It is a far more complex mission than previous forces had to consider. The WW4 soldier is expected to be part diplomat, part aid worker, and part nation builder. Panelist Ahmed Rashid believes there is a crisis between the military and the NGOs in Afghanistan. The rate of change in mission has been too rapid for the military to adapt its strategy from the Cold War, and their command structure is incompatible with the way NGOs work. But the heart of the problem is the very different perspective of each organization.
For the NGOs, whose objectives range from acute disaster relief to long term development, and who therefore expect to spend anything from a few weeks to years in a given place, the issue is how to maintain independence from the military on which they increasingly rely for logistics and security. It is axiomatic in the Aid industry that aid should be ‘independent, neutral and impartial.’ But in the management of complex emergencies there is increasing involvement of the military, and the politics of military intervention means that there is no neutrality or impartiality. The NGOs are fearful that the more they are identified with the military, their safety will be in jeopardy. It is well known that on this basis the Taliban considers Aid workers to be ‘American Slaves. Mike Young is IRCs director for Asia and the Caucasus, and he’s been at it for 12 years. He doesn’t believe in big plans, he’s all for local, which takes time and trust. He’s frightened that if the Taliban remain after the US and UK forces leave, the locals who worked with the Aid agencies will be killed as collaborators. He remains very doubtful of the long term effectiveness of military based Aid, but admits that we’re stuck with what we’ve got.
Major General (Ret.) Tim Cross, who is a veteran the Gulf, the Balkans and Iraq argued that for the military it wasn’t a question of whether they should be doing development and humanitarian intervention, but how. On balance he said that he thought both the military and the NGOs were doing ‘a reasonable job’, but that ‘we have to keep talking to each other.’ So they have very different missions, and very different ways of operating. But they find themselves working together out of necessity. And not only with NGOs. The US marines have been trying to use academics in its efforts for ‘hearts and minds’ and to avoid accidental civilian casualties. The Human Terrain Systems embed social scientists and anthropologists with combat troops to help tacticians with local knowledge. This new kind of counterinsurgency war/complex emergency situation is demanding rapid adaptation, and if that means embedding academics and /or humanitarian workers, so be it.
Uneasy bedfellows they may be, but it looks like they will be stuck with each other for the foreseeable future. Nation building is new and over the last 10 years it’s been pretty hit and miss. Perhaps what is happening is that two distinct mindsets are having to merge, because the prospect of large parts of Africa and Asia collapsing is too dire to imagine.
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